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1 Introduction
In the Bayesian paradigm for presenting forensic evidence to court, it is
recommended that the weight of the evidence be summarized as a likelihood
ratio (LR) between two opposing hypotheses of how the evidence could have
been produced. Such LRs are necessarily based on probabilistic models, the
parameters of which may be uncertain. It has been suggested by some authors
that the value of the LR, being a function of the model parameters should
therefore also be considered uncertain and that this uncertainty should be
communicated to the court.
In this tutorial, we consider a simple example of a fully Bayesian solution,
where model uncertainty is integrated out to produce a value for the LR which
is not uncertain. We show that this solution agrees with common sense. In
particular, the LR magnitude is a function of the amount of data that is
available to estimate the model parameters.
Bayesian methods are often criticised because of the difficulty of choosing
appropriate priors, especially when the priors are non-informative. We do not
deny these difficulties, but the problem is not solved by adopting frequentist
methods that effectively sweep the prior under the carpet and pretend it does
not exist. In this tutorial we do need to choose a non-informative prior and
we choose it by examining the effect it has on the end-result.
We shall reference the following books: E.T. Jaynes, Probability Theory:
The Logic of Science, Cambridge University Press 2003, which we shall ab-
breviate as PTLOS; and D.J. Balding, Weight-of-evidence for Forensic DNA
Profiles, Wiley 2005, abbreviated as WEFDNA.
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2 Simplified DNA model
In this tutorial we shall derive the details of how to compute the LR with
a simplified DNA-like model. The idea is not to provide a recipe that can
be used in real forensic DNA analysis, but rather to choose a model that
facilitates better understanding of the basic look and feel of a fully Bayesian
solution. We need the model to be very simple so that we can perform the
Bayesian integrals in closed form. More realistic models would require more
complex methods, which would obscure the primary purpose of this tutorial.
We suppose that the DNA profile of every individual has K different
binary loci the state of each of which can be either 1 or 0. Every individual
is therefore categorized by K binary variables, which gives a total number
of 2K states.1 We represent a DNA profile by a vector of the form a =
(a1, a2, . . . , aK), where ak ∈ {0, 1} represents the state of locus k.
We assume that given a DNA sample (either recovered at the crime scene
where it was left by the perpetrator, or obtained from the suspect), the state
of each locus may be determined without error.
The main complication is when all suspect and perpetrator loci match,
that there is a non-zero probability that some person other than the suspect
could have the same DNA profile. To compute this probability, we need to
model profile distributions.
3 Profile distribution model
Here we define a generative model that is probably about as simple as it
can be. Again, our goal is just to illustrate the basic principles of a fully
Bayesian approach to this kind of problem. The goal of this exercise is not
to reproduce a realistic DNA model—in real population genetics, the models
are more complex.
Let the probability that locus k of a randomly chosen person has state 1
be qk, and the probability that it has state 0 be 1 − qk. According to this
model we assume the following independencies:
• The locus states are independent: knowing the state of locus k for one
or more individuals, tells us nothing about the states of other loci k′.
1In real DNA profiling, there are different locus types, with more complex state spaces.
For example, STR loci consist of two parts with independent states, one inherited from the
father and the other from the mother. Each part has 2 or more states, called alleles. DNA
profiling technology can detect the state of each part, but does not show which comes from
the mother and which from the father.
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• For each locus k, the binary state for each person is sampled as an iid
Bernoulli trial with parameter qk.
We can collect the locus probabilities in the vector2 q = (q1, q2, . . . , qK).
We refer to q as the model parameter, which encodes everything there is to
know (under the above modelling assumptions) about how locus states are
distributed in the population. The model can be summarized by:
P (a|q) =
K∏
k=1
qakk (1− qk)1−ak (1)
which is the probability that a randomly chosen individual has DNA profile
a = (a1, a2, . . . , aK) in a population characterized by the model parameter
q = (q1, q2, . . . , qK). The complication is that we are not given q. Its value
has to be inferred from prior assumptions and from data.
4 Inferring the model parameter
We do a Bayesian inference for the value of q, by computing a posterior
distribution.
4.1 Prior
As prior for qk, we assign a beta distribution. This choice has a threefold
motivation: (i) The beta distribution is a conjugate prior for this problem,
which allows for closed-form Bayesian calculations. (ii) It is commonly used
in forensic DNA practice. (iii) It is general enough to include various non-
informative priors, which will be of special interest to us.
We assign independently for each qk a beta distribution with hyper-
parameter pik = (αk, βk), so that:
P (q|pi) =
K∏
k=1
Beta(qk|αk, βk) (2)
=
K∏
k=1
qαk−1k (1− qk)βk−1
B(αk, βk)
(3)
2Note that the elements of q usually do not sum to one. These are K independent
probabilities, not one K-ary categorical distribution.
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where we have defined pi = (pi1, pi2, . . . , piK). The normalization constant of
the beta distribution is given by the beta function, defined as:
B(α, β) =
Γ(α)Γ(β)
Γ(α + β)
=
∫ 1
0
qα−1(1− q)β−1 dq (4)
where Γ is the gamma function.
For the beta distribution to be normalized, we need αk, βk > 0 and unless
stated otherwise, we shall assume this condition holds for all our calculations
below. In places, we will however consider the limit as αk = βk → 0. When
we do this, we will follow the advice of PTLOS and complete the whole
calculation under the assumption αk, βk > 0 and apply the limit only to the
final result.
4.1.1 Non-informative priors
If we want to use a non-informative prior, we let α = αk = βk by symmetry,
and we can choose some α, for example in the range 0 < α ≤ 1. The case
α→ 0 is called the Haldane prior, the case α = 0.5 is the Jeffreys prior and
α = 1 is the Laplace prior.
The Haldane prior is flat in the sense that the probability density for
log q
1−q is uniform, but since this reparametrization of q covers the whole real
line, this prior is improper.
The Jeffreys prior is flat in the sense that the probability density for
arcsin(2q − 1) is uniform between −pi
2
and pi
2
.
The Laplace prior is flat in the sense that the probability density for q is
uniform between 0 and 1.
As these names show, different workers in probability theory have ar-
rived at different conclusions about which prior should be used to encode
non-informativeness about the Bernoulli model parameter. To make our cal-
culations concrete, we will have to make a definite choice of prior. We shall
solve this problem in a later section, by examining the effect of the prior on
the end-result of our calculation.
4.1.2 Informative prior
In forensic DNA3 it is customary to reparametrize the beta prior as:
αk =
1− θ
θ
pk , βk =
1− θ
θ
(1− pk) (5)
3See WEFDNA pp. 63-64.
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where 0 < pk < 1 and 0 < θ < 1. Here θ is known as the population struc-
ture parameter. With this parametrization, Beta(qk|αk, βk) has the following
mean and variance:
〈qk〉 = αk
αk + βk
= pk 〈(qk − pk)2〉 = θpk(1− pk) (6)
For small values of θ, one obtains an informative prior, with a small variance
and a sharp peak near pk. In the extreme as θ → 0, we get a strongly
informative prior, which will override contributions made by finite data and
therefore asserts qk = pk.
For the case pk = 12 and θ =
1
2α+1
≥ 1
3
, we recover the above-mentioned
non-informative priors: Laplace at θ = 1
3
, Jeffreys at θ = 1
2
and in the
extreme as θ → 1, the Haldane prior, which gives maximum weight to the
data. These effects will be shown below.
4.2 Database
Wemake provision in our calculation to optionally use a database of examples
to help us infer values for q. Let A = (a1, a2, . . . , aL) be a database of
DNA profiles for L different individuals, where the profile for individual ` is
a` = (a1`, a2`, . . . , aK`) and where ak` ∈ {0, 1} is the binary state of locus k
of individual `. We assume the DNA profiles in A:
• have been sampled iid from the same population as the suspect and
perpetrator and are therefore relevant to inferring the parameter q,
• but the individuals are distinct from the suspect and the perpetrator.
Our calculations will allow for the case of the empty database, where
L = 0.
4.3 Likelihood
Because of our independence assumptions in the model, the likelihood for q,
given the database A is:
P (A|q) =
L∏
`=1
K∏
k=1
qak`k (1− qk)1−ak` (7)
=
K∏
k=1
qnkk (1− qk)L−nk (8)
where nk =
∑L
`=1 ak` is the number of times locus k has state 1 and L− nk
is the number of times it has state 0.
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4.4 Posterior
We can now infer the value of q by computing the posterior:
P (q|A,pi) = P (q|pi)P (A|q)∫
P (q′|pi)P (A|q′) dq′ (9)
=
K∏
k=1
qαk+nk−1k (1− qk)βk+L−nk−1∫ 1
0
q′αk+nk−1k (1− q′k)βk+L−nk−1 dq′k
(10)
=
K∏
k=1
Beta(qk|αk + nk, βk + L− nk) (11)
where the integral in the denominator was solved by inspection, by recogniz-
ing the numerator as another beta distribution. This is due to the fact that
the beta distribution is conjugate to the Bernoulli likelihood and therefore
should result in a beta posterior. Notice that if the database is empty, then
nk = L = 0 and the posterior is just the prior.
The prior parameters αk and βk play the same roles mathematically as
the event counts nk and L− nk and are consequently referred to as pseudo-
counts. The total pseudo count, α+β can be interpreted as the size of some
pseudo database, which is then effectively pooled with A by the additions
in (11).
In the alternative prior parametrization, 1−θ
θ
pk and 1−θθ (1 − pk) are the
pseudo counts and 1−θ
θ
is the size of the pseudo database.
The posterior P (q|A,pi) represents our total state of knowledge about q
and can be used in all calculations in place of the unknown q.
5 Forensic LR
We are given two DNA profiles: One for the suspect, s = (s1, s2, . . . , sK) and
one for the perpetrator, r = (r1, r2, . . . , rK). We work with two hypotheses
and assume they are the only possible explanations for the observed data
s, r:
• The prosecution hypothesis, Hp, asserts that suspect and perpetrator
are the same person.
• The defence hypothesis Hd, asserts that they are different individuals.
Below we compute the likelihoods under each hypothesis. For now, we assume
that if they don’t match, r 6= s, then in the absence of DNA measurement
errors, this proves deductively that Hd is true and Hp is false.
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In the matched case, r = s, however, we need probabilistic reasoning.
The most natural way to do this would be to compute the posterior,
P (Hp|r, s,A,pi,Π) = 1− P (Hd|r, s,A,pi,Π) (12)
where we have introduced the prior for the prosecution hypothesis,
Π = P (Hp|Π) = 1− P (Hd|Π) (13)
which is assigned by a reasoning process not involving DNA profiles. How-
ever, in the Bayesian paradigm for presenting evidence in court one equiva-
lently considers the posterior odds for Hp against Hd, which can be separated4
into two factors: likelihood ratio and prior odds, respectively representing the
contributions of the DNA analysis and all other evidence not related to DNA:
P (Hp|r, s,A,pi,Π)
P (Hd|r, s,A,pi,Π) = LR
Π
1− Π (14)
where
LR =
P (r, s|Hp,A,pi)
P (r, s|Hd,A,pi) (15)
is referred to as the likelihood ratio. It is then recommended that the end-
goal of the forensic DNA analysis is to compute LR, which can be done
independently of Π. We derive expressions for both likelihoods below and
then form the ratio.
Finally, notice that if LR = 1, then the DNA analysis is completely non-
informative about Hp versus Hd: in this case the posterior (odds) is the same
as the prior (odds).
5.1 Prosecution likelihood
Under the prosecution hypothesis, r and s come from the same individual,
so that P (r, s|Hp,q) = δ(r, s)P (s|q), where δ(r, r) = 1, or δ(r, s) = 0 if
r 6= s. Since we are not given q, but instead we are given the prior pi and
the database A, we must condition on what we have and instead compute:
P (r, s|Hp,pi,A) = δ(r, s)P (s|pi,A) (16)
4In the real world, this simple factorization applies only in a limited number of cases.
If different alternative culprits, with different levels of relatedness to the suspect are con-
sidered, somewhat more general formulas have to be used, as explained in WEFDNA.
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where
P (s|pi,A) =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
· · ·
∫ 1
0
P (s|q)P (q|pi,A) dq1dq2 · · · dqK (17)
=
∫
Q
P (s|q)P (q|pi,A) dq (18)
where Q is short-hand for the K-cube over which we are integrating. Note
P (s|pi,A) is called the predictive distribution for s, because it predicts the
value of an as yet unseen profile, given that we have already seen the profiles
in A. Again by virtue of the conjugate prior, the predictive distribution can
be found in closed form:
P (s|pi,A) =
∫
Q
P (s|q)P (q|pi,A) dq (19)
=
K∏
k=1
∫ 1
0
qskk (1− qk)1−sk
qαk+nk−1k (1− qk)βk+L−nk−1
B(αk + nk, βk + L− nk) dqk (20)
=
K∏
k=1
∫ 1
0
qαk+sk+nk−1k (1− qk)βk+L+1−sk−nk−1 dqk
B(αk + nk, βk + L− nk) (21)
=
K∏
k=1
B(αk + sk + nk, βk + L+ 1− sk − nk)
B(αk + nk, βk + L− nk) (22)
=
K∏
k=1
P (sk|pik, nk, L) (23)
Now we can expand the beta functions in terms of gamma functions and
simplify the ratios of gammas with the identity Γ(x+ 1) = xΓ(x), to find the
predictive probability:5
P (sk = 1|pik, nk, L) = αk + nk
αk + βk + L
(24)
=
(1− θ)pk + θnk
(1− θ) + θL (25)
For the informative prior case, notice that θ gives interpolation weights be-
tween data and the prior parameter pk. At the one extreme if θ → 1 (Haldane
prior), we disregard the prior parameter pk and end up with just the data
proportion nk
L
. At the other extreme if θ = 0, we disregard the data A and
end up with the prior parameter pk. (If we use the non-informative Laplace
5Notice (25) agrees with equation 5.6 on page 64 in WEFDNA.
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prior, with αk = βk = 1, then (24) is known as Laplace’s rule of succession.)
Finally, the predictive probability6 for the event sk = 0 is:
P (sk = 0|pik, nk, L) = βk + L− nk
αk + βk + L
(26)
=
(1− θ)(1− pk) + θ(L− nk)
(1− θ) + θL (27)
Note that even for an empty database (L = nk = 0), our assumption αk, βk >
0 guarantees non-zero predictive probabilities.
5.2 Defence likelihood
Under the defence hypothesis, r and s come from different individuals and
their probabilities are independent given q, so that P (r, s|q) = P (r|q)P (s|q).
However, q is not given, so the independence no longer holds: knowledge of
one profile changes the probability for q, which in turn changes the proba-
bility for the other profile. This dependency is automatically taken care of
by applying the rules of probability theory by integrating out the unknown
q:
P (r, s|Hd,pi,A) =
∫
Q
P (r|q)P (s|q)P (q|pi,A) dq (28)
=
K∏
k=1
B(αk + sk + rk + nk, βk + L+ 2− rk − sk − nk)
B(αk + nk, βk + L− nk)
(29)
=
K∏
k=1
P (rk, sk|pik, nk, L) (30)
where we can expand and simplify again to find the predictive probability:
P (rk = sk = 1|pik, nk, L) = αk + nk
αk + βk + L
αk + nk + 1
αk + βk + L+ 1
(31)
= P (rk = 1|pik, nk, L)P (sk = 1|pik, nk + 1, L+ 1)
(32)
Notice the similarity between the two factors in the RHS: the right fac-
tor is obtained from the left by adding 1’s to the observation counts. No-
tice also that if α + nk  1, then P (rk = sk = 1|pik, nk, L) ≈ P (rk =
1|pik, nk, L)P (sk = 1|pik, nk, L), making the two events almost independent.
6Notice P (sk = 0|αk, βk, nk, L) + P (sk = 1|αk, βk, nk, L) = 1.
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The probability for the other event of interest7 is obtained similarly as:
P (rk = sk = 0|pik, nk, L) = P (rk = 0|pik, nk, L)P (sk = 0|pik, nk, L+ 1) (33)
5.3 LR
Forming the likelihood-ratio, we find:
LR =
P (r, s|Hp,pi,A)
P (r, s|Hd,pi,A) =
K∏
k=1
LRk(rk, sk) (34)
where
LRk(r, s) =
δ(r, s)P (s|pik, nk, L)
P (r, s|pik, nk, L) (35)
=
δ(r, s)P (s|pik, nk, L)
P (s, s|pik, nk, L) (36)
=
δ(r, s)P (s|pik, nk, L)
P (s|pik, nk, L)P (s|pik, nk + s, L+ 1) (37)
=
δ(r, s)
P (s|pik, nk + s, L+ 1) (38)
More explicitly, for the mismatched cases we have
LRk(0, 1) = LRk(1, 0) = 0 (39)
and for the matched cases we have
LRk(1, 1) =
αk + βk + L+ 1
αk + nk + 1
, LRk(0, 0) =
αk + βk + L+ 1
βk + L+ 1− nk (40)
or, with the other prior parametrization:
LRk(1, 1) =
(1− θ) + θ(L+ 1)
(1− θ)pk + θ(nk + 1) (41)
and
LRk(0, 0) =
(1− θ) + θ(L+ 1)
(1− θ)(1− pk) + θ(L+ 1− nk) (42)
Notice again, that θ interpolates between data and the prior parameter pk.
The minimum value (for the matched case rk = sk) is 1. This is a consequence
of the error-free measurement assumption. If non-zero error probabilities
were considered, values of less than 1 would be possible.
7We don’t need the events (0, 1) and (1, 0) here, because we are interested in the case
where profiles match.
10
6 Plug-in recipe
In this section, we shall refer to:
• One or more reference populations, from which one or more databases
are drawn to help to estimate the parameters pk and θ for an informa-
tive prior.
• The relevant population, from which the suspect and perpetrator were
drawn.
In the general case, all these populations are assumed different from each
other in the sense that locus state frequencies may differ between them.
For forensic DNA applications, WEFDNA motivates a plug-in recipe to
compute the LR, where values for θ and the pk are point-estimates made from
one or more reference databases. In this recipe, the pk are representative of
the frequencies in the reference populations, while the value of θ is chosen to
reflect by how much the corresponding frequencies in the relevant population
may differ. Small values of θ encode small expected differences and larger
values encode larger expected differences. WEFDNA motivates for values in
the range 1% ≤ θ ≤ 5% to be used for most applications.
Our database A, as defined in section 4.2, is assumed to be drawn from
the relevant population, but in the usual forensic scenario, additional profiles
from the relevant population are not available. In our notation, this means
A is empty.
In summary, in the WEFDNA plug-in recipe we set L = nk = 0, the pk
are generally different from 1
2
and θ is smallish. This forms an informative
prior for the qk. This gives, for rk = sk:
LRk(1, 1) =
1
(1− θ)pk + θ LRk(0, 0) =
1
(1− θ)(1− pk) + θ (43)
7 Fully Bayesian recipe
Now we turn to the main purpose of this document, namely to explore a fully
Bayesian recipe, where we start with a non-informative prior and use only
the given data, A, r, s, to infer the model parameter.
It must be emphasized that this fully Bayesian recipe cannot be used as is
to replace the plug-in recipe, because here we use the luxury of database A,
sampled from the relevant population. As noted above, in a realistic scenario,
we do not have this luxury: instead we have to make do with data sampled
from some other, somewhat different, reference population. Although a fully
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Bayesian recipe could in principle be derived for this more realistic scenario,
this would come at the cost of a considerable increase in both conceptual
difficulties as well as computational complexity.
In this section, therefore we assume we do have a database, A, sampled
from the relevant database and the only difficulty that remains is to choose
the non-informative prior.
7.1 Which prior?
We are now faced with making a choice amongst the different flavours of non-
informative priors. That is, we have to choose αk and βk, or equivalently pk
and θ.
We concede that we are choosing a prior under the perhaps arbitrary
constraint that it should be a beta distribution. A more thorough motivation
for the prior should perhaps involve solving functional equations in the style
of PTLOS. We feel however that the beta distribution already provides a
rich enough space for the choice of prior. Moreover, as mentioned above,
the non-informative Haldane, Jeffreys and Laplace priors all members of the
beta family.
To start, we motivate the choice α = αk = βk, or equivalently pk =
αk
αk+βk
= 1
2
. Before we have seen any data, all loci are on an equal footing,
so that the priors for all k must be the same. Next consider a database A
with an equal number of 0’s and 1’s for some locus k, so that nk = L − nk.
In this situation, there is no reason to prefer one state to the other, so
that the model parameter posterior should satisfy the symmetry condition:
P (qk|αk, βk, L, nk) = P (1 − qk|αk, βk, L, nk), which is obtained at αk = βk.
Another way to see this is simply to require LRk(0, 0) = LRk(1, 1) when
nk = L− nk.
Now we have pk = 12 and we still need to choose θ. To do this, consider
the case of the empty database, with L = nk = 0, for which case we still
want our recipe to give a sensible answer. Now (41) and (42) give:
LRk(1, 1) = LRk(0, 0) =
1
(1− θ)1
2
+ θ
=
2
1 + θ
(44)
When A is empty, we now argue that we don’t even know whether the locus
state varies in the population. So we are not justified in concluding that the
match at the locus modifies the probabilities for Hp vs Hd. If we maximize
θ at the limit θ → 1, then we obtain the non-informative value of LRk = 1,
so that the DNA evidence is effectively disregarded.
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7.2 Analysis
Here we analyse the behaviour of LRk(rk, sk), when rk = sk and θ = 1. We
get:
LRk(1, 1) =
L+ 1
nk + 1
, LRk(0, 0) =
L+ 1
L+ 1− nk (45)
We make several observations:
• The matched likelihood ratios are bounded: 1 ≤ LRk(s, s) ≤ L + 1.
We have already commented on the lower bound. The upper bound
is determined by the database size, L. This makes intuitive sense, the
larger the database, the more our maximum confidence grows. Note
however, that this maximum should be a relatively rare occurrence, as
shown below.
• For an empty database, if L = nk = 0, then as discussed, LRk(1, 1) =
LRk(0, 0) = 1.
• For a non-empty database, as long as a locus k has the same state in
all of the observed data, A, r, s, then the LR is still unity: If nk = L,
then LRk(1, 1) = 1 and if nk = 0, then LRk(0, 0) = 1.
• Conversely, for a given database size L, the maximum LR value is
reached when the locus state observed in sk = rk has never been ob-
served in A. This implies the trait shared by the suspect and perpetra-
tor is rare. The larger the database size, L, the more we are convinced
of the rarity and the more we are convinced of the identity of suspect
and perpetrator.
• For a large database, where both nk  1 and L−nk  1, the likelihood
ratio for sk = rk is the inverse of the frequency of the corresponding
event in the database: LRk(1, 1) ≈ Lnk and LRk(0, 0) ≈ LL−nk .
We can briefly compare this recipe to a very naive recipe, where we simply
assign qk = nkL , irrespective of the size of the database. This would give
LR(1, 1) = L
nk
and LRk(0, 0) = LL−nk . This agrees with the last case above of
the Bayesian recipe, but in any other cases it could give overconfident results.
In particular, if nk = 0, or nk = L, one could get infinite LR values, which
would be ridiculous in the extreme if L = 1. The fully Bayesian recipe agrees
with the naive recipe when data is plentiful, but continues to give sensible
answers even when the data gets scarce to the point of vanishing.
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7.2.1 Comment on Haldane prior
With a more realistic DNA model, where each STR locus has two indepen-
dent sides (paternal and maternal), we can gain some extra insight into the
nature of the Haldane prior. In this case, it can be shown (WEFDNA, sec-
tion 6.2.2) that when L = 0, the LR for a locus can nevertheless reach a
maximum of 3. If the paternal and maternal sides are the same, then we get
LR=1, but if they are different, we get LR=3. From this fact and the third
bullet above, we learn that:
The LR at locus k becomes non-informative (LRk = 1) under the
Haldane prior, if and only if no state change has been observed
at locus k in all of the data, A, r, s.
One may argue that loci used for forensic DNA profiling have been chosen
for the purpose of giving good discrimination between individuals, precisely
because they do vary appreciably between individuals and that therefore
the Haldane prior is too extreme. However, we are concerned here with sub-
populations, about which we cannot assume that every locus is informative—
it may well be that a certain locus is constant over the whole sub-population.
We therefore argue that the behaviour of the Haldane prior is appropriate:
the LR for a locus remains non-informative (LRk = 1), until we have observed
at least one state change in our data.
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